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ROOTS OF THE LEMON TREE
Richard G. Kline* and Edward T. Colbert*
This article is addressed to the current question concerning
the priority benefits which are to be accorded foreign nationals
who seek trademark registrations in the United States under the
priority provisions of the International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property,' as implemented by the United
States Trademark Act of 1946 (Federal Trademark Act).2 After its
adoption in 1883, this multilateral International Convention and
successive revisions have been ratified by virtually every major
nation throughout the world,3 including the United States and
Canada, 4 to accommodate prevailing basic differences that
continue to exist between common law countries where use of a
trademark is an essential prerequisite to obtaining protection by
registration and civil law countries where rights to a trademark
are established by registration without a requirement of use. In
* Senior Partner, Beveridge, DeGrandi, Kline & Lunsford, Washington, D.C.
** Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, whose views are personal and do not
necessarily reflect those of the agency.
1. International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,
revised at Washington in 1911, 204 O.G. 1011, July 21, 1914 (38 Stat. 1645; T. S. No.
579); signed at The Hague in 1925, 407 O.G. 298, June 9, 1931 (47 Stat. 1789); T. S.
No. 834); at London in 1934, 613 O.G. 23, August 3, 1948 (53 Stat. 1748; T. S. No.
941); at Lisbon in 1958, 775 O.G. 321; February 13, 1962 (53 Stat. 1748); and at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
3. Countries which have adhered to various revisions of the Convention
include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany (Federal
Republic), Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, People's Republic of the
Congo, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rhodesia, Romania, San Marino, Senegal,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo,
Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Viet-Nam,
Yugoslavia, Zambia.
4. The last revision to which both the United States and Canada have
adhered, and which consequently governs the obligations and rights between
citizens of those countries, is the London revision of 1934.
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the vast majority of nations, use is not a requirement for the
application for or obtaining of a trademark registration. 5
I. CONVENTION PRIORITY
Few problems pertaining to the international recognition of
trademark rights have created more controversy than the
provisions relating to the benefit of priority accorded by this
Convention.6 These provisions were reinterpreted recently by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
SCM Corporation v. Langis Foods. Ltd.,7 where the concept of
"constructive use" was recognized for the first time to provide
protection for foreign applicants seeking to register a trademark
in the United States under the International Convention. This
decision has been universally referred to as the "Lemon Tree"
case which designates the trademark both parties sought to
register in the United States for a flavored mix used to produce a
lemon beverage.
Langis Foods, Ltd., a Canadian corporation obtained a
registration for the mark Lemon Tree in the United States based
upon an application for registration filed within six (6) months
after applying to register the mark in Canada. John Lecroy &
5. LADAS, PATENTS TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS, Chapter 31 § 632 p.
1196 (Harv. Univ. Press 1975); Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act- Use in Commerce
by the Foreign Applicant as a Prerequisite to Securing a United States Trademark
Registration, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REv. 308, n.1.
6. See 53 Stat. 1748. Priority rights are based upon Article 4 of the
International Convention, which provides in pertinent part:
A. (1) Any person who has duly applied for the registration of a . .. trade
mark in one of the countries of the Union, or his legal representative or
assignee, shall enjoy for the purposes of registration in other countries a right
of priority during the period hereinafter stated. (Emphasis added.)
(2) Any filing having the value of a formal national filing by virtue of the
international law of each country of the Union or of international treaties
concluded among several countries of the Union shall be recognized as giving
rise to a right of priority.
B. Consequently, subsequent filing in one of the other countries of the Union
before the expiration of these periods shall not be invalidated through any acts
accomplished in the interval, as, for instance, by another filing. . . or by use
of the trade mark, and these facts cannot give rise to any right of third parties
or any personal possession. The rights acquired by third parties before the day
of the first application on. which priority is based shall be reserved by the
internal legislation of each country of the Union.
C. (1) The above-mentioned periods of priority shall be ... 6 months.., for
trade marks.
7. 539 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Son, Inc." petitioned to cancel the Lemon Tree registration
predicated upon an intervening use of the identical mark in the
United States initiated during the period between the filing of the
application for registration of the conflicting mark in Canada9
and presentation of a corresponding application for registration of
the Canadian mark in the United States. 10 Lemon Tree presented
the issue of whether a corporate foreign national, which had
applied for a trademark registration in Canada, had priority in
registering that trademark in the United States over a domestic
corporation when: (1) the foreign national filed a trademark
application in Canada without prior use of the trademark in any
country; (2) the foreign national subsequently filed a timely
application to register the trademark in the United States based
upon the earlier Canadian application; (3) the foreign national
used the trademark in Canada, but not in the United States prior
to filing of the United States application; and (4) the domestic
corporation used the trademark in the United States after the
foreign national's Canadian application had been filed but before
the foreign national's United States application was filed. The
District Court concluded that the domestic corporation was
entitled to registration of the trademark. The Appellate Court
reversed."
To the extent necessary to give effect to the benefits of priority
provided by the Convention, the United States enacted an
enabling provision to assure foreign nationals of other member
countries that an application for registration of a trademark filed
in the United States within the 6-month period of priority
provided by the Convention would "be accorded the same force
and effect" as if filed in this country on the date of the initial
foreign filing in a Convention country.12 Article 4B of the
Convention provides that the subsequent filing in a member
country shall not be invalidated by any intervening acts taking
8. The case proceeded before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the
United States Patent Office and United States District Court for the District of
Columbia as John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods, Ltd. 177 USPQ 717 (TTAB,
1973); id., 376 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C. 1974). John Lecroy & Son, Inc. was acquired by
SCM Corporation during the pendency of the controversy.
9. March 28, 1969.
10. September 19, 1969. A detailed discussion of the facts appear in Berry,
Recent Developments Affecting the Protection of Convention Registration Marks
in the United States, 57 JPOS 591 (1975).
11. 539 F.2d at 197.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1970).
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place during the limited six-month period of priority, specifically
by use of a conflicting mark by another person initiated during
the priority period, or by filing an application for registration
during the priority period.
Under the enabling provisions of the Federal Trademark Act,
which were enacted with the express intent "to provide rights and
remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trade-
marks . . . entered into between the United States and foreign
nations,"'13 foreign applicants are entitled to the benefits of
priority provided by the Convention "to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention. ' 14
II. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The argument that this Convention discriminates against
United States citizens, an argument which the District Court
accepted and relied upon in deciding Lemon Tree, 5 conflicts with
the very principle of accord represented by the Convention. This
protective attitude also ignores precedents in the interpretation of
treaties. As expressed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Pink,"6 "[tihe power of a state to refuse enforcement of rights
based on foreign law which runs counter to the public policy of the
forum ... must give way before the superior Federal policy
evidenced by a treaty or international compact or agreement."
In proper perspective, the limited reservation of registration
rights does not extend beyond the six-month period of priority.
Recognition of this limited reservation of registration rights is
both rational and reasonable.
First, the object of the Convention is to secure to the nationals
of all the contracting countries priority protection, not merely a
"procedural advantage." The district court misconstrued this
policy goal in reaching its decision.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1970).
15. "To allow a substantive priority to a foreign applicant would be to grant to
him greater rights than those available to United States citizens. This is contrary
to the Paris Union Treaty [the Convention] and to the Lanham Act." 376 F. Supp.
at 968. By failing to recognize a clear provision of the Convention a misapplication
of domestic law occurred. E.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884). In
American Petrofina, Inc. v. Brown, 184 USPQ 483 (E.D.N.C., 1974), that court
declined to follow this misinterpretation which it found difficult to reconcile with
the priority provisions of the Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1970).
16. 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942).
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Secondly, in the context of international relationships a
manufacturer may adopt a trademark in one country in connec-
tion with articles manufactured there, often for exportation to
other countries. No manufacturer can reasonably be expected or
required to transport these products, immediately following an
initiated use of a trademark in his own country, to all other
foreign markets in order to acquire rights there by use of the
mark. 17 Investigations of the marketing conditions and the
product acceptability in different foreign countries must first be
evaluated to determine whether there is a commercial demand.
Distribution outlets must be established. Promotional material
often precedes the introduction of a product line which competi-
tors will immediately evaluate long before the product is available
for export. While the trademarked product is being test-marketed
and packaged in preparation for its introduction, pirates are
everywhere ready to misappropriate a competitor's trademark.' 8
If the lower court in Lemon Tree had succeeded in repudiating
by judicial interpretation this limited reservation of the right to
register a trademark during the six-month period of priority
provided under the International Convention, not only foreign
interests but United States manufacturers would have been
threatened with the danger of introducing a product for export to
a foreign market under a particular mark that has been
misappropriated and registered during the interim. To guard
against this danger and to protect such rights, the International
Convention accords a limited right of priority for a six-month
period, allowing nationals of any member country to apply for
registration of the trademark in other member countries, which
otherwise could be denied if required to first use that mark in
order to acquire a valid trademark right by registration.
Thirdly, equally important is the recognition that member
countries have always extended United States trademark owners
the benefits of priority accorded under this international arrange-
ment without requiring use of a trademark during the limited
period of priority while preserving the right to register, even if
conflicting rights of a third party may have arisen either by use of
the mark or the filing of an application during the six-month
period of priority. This imposes an obligation upon the United
17. See LADAS, supra note 5, § 632, p. 1196.
18. This problem has been widely recognized for a long time. See, ROGERS,
GOODWILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING, 111-113 (A. W. Shaw &.Co., 1914).
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States to respect these commitments in exchange for expecting
similar treatment of United States' nationals under the Interna-
tional Convention. To suggest that this is discriminatory in favor
of foreign nationals is an unreasonable construction of the
principles undergirding the Convention and in complete discord
not only with the historical negotiations surrounding adherence to
the International Convention by the United States, but also the
legislative history of the enabling enactment.
International criticism of the lower court decision in Lemon
Tree was immediate:
Through . . . the 1974 decision of Chief Judge Hart of the
District Court for the District of Columbia in the Lemon Tree
case, the attention of foreign applicants has once again been
focused upon the inequitable treatment afforded the foreign
applicant under the U.S. interpretation of the Paris Conven-
tion.19
III. INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES
As a self-executing treaty,20 the International Convention
would stand on its own for purposes of interpretation and
enforcement, 21 in the absence of a later act of Congress purporting
to limit or eliminate some or all of the Convention provisions.
22
The Supreme Court has long recognized this principle:
19. See, Wegner and Pagenberg, Paris Convention Priority: a Unique
American Viewpoint Denying "The Same Effect" to the Foreign Filing. 5 IIC 361,
361-62 (1974); the original German text of which appeared in 1974 GRUR
(Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht) 308.
20. There is authority for the proposition that the Convention was self-
executing and, therefore, the implementing legislation was unnecessary, but served
only to affirm the commitments to its terms by the United States. LADAS, PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS, (Harvard University Press 1975) §§ 135 & 641,
p. 120. The district court in Lemon Tree expressly assumed the self-executing
nature of the Convention. But see, Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880 (CCPA, 1973)
dealing with patent rights under Article 4 of the International Convention, which
held the Convention was not self-executing. However, under the pertinent tests for
the self-executing nature of a treaty, the Convention appears to possess the
necessary attributes, "in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive
action pursuant to its provisions." Cook v. United States (The Mazel Tov) 288 U.S.
102, 119 n.19 (1933).
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
74 Am. Jur. 2d Treaties § 3 (1974).
22. Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291
U.S. 138, 160 (1934); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896).
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A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is,
whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights
of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And
when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of
justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision
for the case before it as it would to a statute.2
3
Repudiation or modification of a convention or treaty is not to
be lightly inferred, and "never admitted where the former can
stand with the new act,"' 24 but rather, the words of the act of
Congress must be clear and unequivocal that the prior treaty is
meant to be abrogated. "A treaty will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed. '25
This principle of avoiding a legislative act of abrogation is
accorded special consideration when it would modify provisions of
a treaty according a valuable right to the United States or its
citizens,26 or, when the act by its very terms or title purports to
recognize the existence as well as enforce the provisions of a
treaty obligation of the United States.27
It is inconceivable that a convention which, while granting
foreign nationals certain specific, limited rights, also secured to
United States citizens in every member country the same special
rights being accorded those foreign nationals, should be nullified
by a restrictive interpretation of a statute purporting to give "full
force and effect" to the very terms of that treaty.
Where, as here, the enabling statute specifically seeks t6 give
the "same force and effect," not merely "some" force and effect, to
the corresponding priority provisions of the International Conven-
tion and also seeks to implement these provisions to the extent
necessary to give effect thereto, the Convention should be
consulted for interpretive assistance, rather than ignored by a
23. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
24. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884).
25. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). Accord, Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896); Pigeon River Improvement Co. v. Charles W. Cox,
Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934). 74 Am. Jur. 2d Treaties § 16 (1974).
26. Cf., United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496
(1883).
27. 112 U.S. at 553-54. The official title of the Federal Trademark Act is: "An
Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce,
to carry out the provisions of certain international conventions, and for other
purposes." (Emphasis supplied). 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
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restrictive construction, if that can be done without violating the
language of either.28 The Convention and Statute should be
construed together so as to give effect to both and thereby insure
that the international obligations of the United States are
performed, rather than breached. This requires consideration of
the basic principles of treaty interpretation.
IV. TREATY INTERPRETATION
Under the Supremacy Clause contained in Article VI, Section
2 of the Constitution, courts should endeavor to construe an
International Convention and a United States statute so as to
give effect to both without violating the language of either.29
Courts also must recognize the principles which control
diplomatic relations between soverign nations. Accordingly, the
enabling provisions contained in 15 U.S.C. 1126(b) should be
liberally construed "to the extent necessary to give effect to Article
4 of the Convention."' 3 These principles were restated by the
Supreme Court in Factor v. Laubenheimer:31
In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty
obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be
avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed
controlling in the interpretation of international agreements.
Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations
between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well,
require that their obligations should be liberally construed so
as to effect apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity between them. For that reason if a
treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the
rights which may be claimed under it, and the other
enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.
28. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902); United States v. Gue
Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 465 (1900); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); 74
Am. Jur. 2d, Treaties § 16 (1974).
29. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Homer v. United States,
143 U.S. 570, 578 (1892).
30. 15 U.S.C. 1126(b) (1946); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879);
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884); Valentine v. United States,
299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1929); Nielson v.
Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929).
31. 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933).
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This interpretative inter-relationship between treaties and
federal statutes requires consideration of the principles of
international law and treaty interpretation. 32 Although the
Vienna Convention is not retroactive in nature, 33 it does
specifically provide for and enumerates the common principles of
treaty interpretation generally applied by the United States in
accordance with international law and comity among nations.34
A. Pacta Sunt Servanda
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith. '35
This requirement of good faith is the sine qua non of all
international arrangements, and is especially important in the
case of treaties and international conventions. The need for good
faith in the interpretation of treaties was paramount, since the
enforcement of the obligations of a treaty are dependent upon the
honor of the country where rights are sought to be enforced, there
being no means for the enforcement of international arguments
except by unilateral aggressive or retaliatory action, such as
boycotts, blockades, armed conflict or the threat of such conflict,36
as was recognized by the Supreme Court in Edye v. Robertson:37
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on
the interest and the honor of the governments which are
parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of
international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the
injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end
be enforced by actual war.
It is, of course, not suggested that the failure to award priority
as required by the International Convention would lead to
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted by the United Nations
Conference on May 23, 1959, reprinted in [1969] U.N. JUmDICAL Y.B. 140.
33. Id. Part I, Article 4.
34. Id. Part I, Articles 3 and 4.
35. Vienna Convention, Part III, Observance, Application and Interpretation
of Treaties, Section 1: Observance of Treaties, Article 26.
36. 112 U.S. at 540.
37. Id. at 598.
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international conflict, but the alternatives are given only to
demonstrate the reliance placed upon good faith enforcement of
treaty obligations.
B. Internal Law and Observance of Treaties
"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."38
This principle has long been recognized and enforced in the
United States. 39 There is nothing in the domestic law of the
United States which conflicts with the provisions of the Conven-
tion. To the contrary, Section 44(d) of the Federal Trademark Act
of 1946 was enacted to ensure the application of the provisions of
the Convention in the registration and protection of certain
trademarks by foreign applicants. Article 27 prohibits a refusal to
perform under the treaty provisions while Article 46 prohibits the
invalidation of consent to a treaty, predicated on possible conflicts
with domestic law. These articles constitute an international
recognition of the United States constitutional provisions which
place self-executing treaties on the same level as Acts of
Congress. 40
The most important case in the area of interpretation of
international conventions, as applied to trademark rights, is
Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech.41 There the court was concerned with
an act of the Puerto Rican legislature that prohibited the use of
previously known or used brands or trademarks on distilled
beverages manufactured or sold in Puerto Rico, unless such use
commenced prior to a certain date or had been used exclusively in
the continental United States. The question presented was
whether this limitation discriminated against foreign nationals,
contrary to the provisions of the General Inter-American Conven-
tion for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection of 1929.42
38. Vienna Convention, Article 27.
39. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 70-71 (1821).
40. Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 46 (1852); Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
41. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
42. Ratified February 11, 1931 and proclaimed February 27, 1931. 46 Stat.
2907. The pertinent provision, Article 3, stated:
Every mark duly registered or legally protection in one of the Contracting
States shall be udmitted to registration or deposit and legally protected in the
other Contracting States, upon compliance with the formal provisions of the
domestic law of such States.
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The Puerto Rican government defended itself from the charge
of discrimination against foreign nationals43 by alleging that the
law was enforced against its own citizens, and, therefore, no one
was permitted to use an established foreign trademark on distilled
beverages.
In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court established
principles which should have been, but were not, observed by the
district court in Lemon Tree, "When protection is sought for such
marks a ratifying State cannot escape the obligations of the treaty
and deny protection by the simple device of embracing its own
nationals in that denial. That would make a mockery of the
treaty."44
C. General Rule of Interpretation
"A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose. '45
This provision is merely an amplification of the previously
stated requirement of good faith in the performance of treaty
obligations, with the clarification of terms of such treaties or
internal conventions being made in accordance with the estab-
lished statutory interpretation requirement of using the ordinary
meaning of words when taken in their whole context, and not in
an artificial or special sense impressed upon such terms by local
law or usage.46
D. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31
[ordinary meaning of term], or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
43. The "Barcardi" trademark was the property of a Cuban corporation,
Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A., and licensed to the petitioner/plaintiff, Bacardi
Corporation of America, for manufacture and sale in Puerto Rico.
44. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 165 (1940).
45. Vienna Convention, Section 3: Interpretation of Treaties, Article 31.
46. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
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(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasona-
ble. 47
This provision is a formal international recognition of the
basis for and propriety of seeking out the "negotiating history" of
a treaty or international convention in the same manner as
statutes may be interpreted upon consideration of the "legislative
history" thereof, a practice long established before the courts of
the United States. 48 Early Supreme Court cases even went so far
as to endorse examination of convention history without first
making a finding of ambiguity.49
Included in this history of the Convention, should be the
interpretation and construction of all prior texts of the Conven-
tion, in light of which all revisions were necessarily made.50
V. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS 5 1
The relevant language of Article 4 of the original text of the
1833 Paris Convention, first adhered to by the United States in
1887, leaves no doubt about the preservation of rights to
effectively protect the benefits of Convention priority: "Conse-
quently, the subsequent filing ... shall not be invalidated
through any acts accomplished in the interval, as for instance, by
another filing . . . or by use of the mark. '5 2
During the original proceedings of the first conference in
Paris, "filing" and "use" were considered essential aspects of the
priority provision. The first draft of the treaty contained language
describing a limited reservation of the registers in all the adhering
47. Vienna Convention, Article 32.
48. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929). As stated by the Supreme Court
in Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1934):
"It has often been said that when the meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse
may be had to the negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspon-
dence of the contracting parties to establish its meaning."
49. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933); Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933).
50. Cf., United States v Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 72 (1952).
51. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the United States
Patent Office in opening its archives and permitting access to many Convention
documents and other contemporaneous related documents.
52. The priority rights were recognized by the United States Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia, before which the Lemon Tree case is pending, in Deitsch
Bros. v. Loomen, 39 App. D.C. 114, 117 (1912).
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countries. This resulted from an amendment which made it clear
that the rights of the first applicant, claiming priority, would be
protected against any and all intervening acts, not just an
intervening filing by another person. In the revised draft,
trademarks were specifically referred to, with the clear intent that
any use of the mark during the period of priority that might have
the effect under national law of invalidating the rights of priority
could not have any such effect on the applicant asserting priority
in a member country. Essentially the same language was adopted
at the conference on November 18, 1880 and the concept embodied
therein has been unchanged throughout the history of the
Convention.
Subsequent texts of the Convention contained some revisions
of the language of Article 4 but, in every respect, these changes
served only to confirm or clarify the original intent of the text as
far as its priority benefits were concerned.
However, the original text of Article 4 contained a clause in
the first paragraph to the effect that enjoyment of the right of
priority was "subject to the rights of third parties" which was not
deleted until the London revision in 1934. Considerable doubt
existed in other countries as to whether that exception would only
apply to one who obtained rights in a mark by use prior to the
filing date of the first foreign application. This ambiguity was
definitively clarified at the revision conference of London in 1934,
as a result of which the reservation was eliminated and replaced
by a sentence to the opposite effect; namely, that acts accomp-
lished during the priority period "cannot give rise to any right of
third parties."5 3 In addition, the London text completed this
interpretation by a specific reservation of third party rights
acquired prior to the date of the first application in the foreign
country (Article 4B, last sentence).
An article entitled "The London Conference of 1934" in the
magazine Industrial Property, 1934, published by the Interna-
tional Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property, recognized
that the modification of Article 4 of the Convention, pertaining to
the abolishment of the reservation of the rights of third parties
during the priority period was the most significant result achieved
at the London Conference.
This shift in emphasis in the Convention is all the more
significant since it has been held in connection with the
53. Article 4B, supra n.6.
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interpretation of domestic United States statutes that the use of
negative language is a strong indication of the mandatory nature
of a provision, i.e., a prohibition is absolute and cannot be
modified, limited or conditioned.5 4 Similar negative language
appeared in the Paris Treaty of 1783, ending the American War of
Independence which was interpreted in Ware v. Hylton.5 Article 4
of the treaty provided, "It is agreed that creditors, on either side,
shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full
value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts, heretofore
contracted."
The defense interposed and considered by the Court, was
performance by the debtor under a Virginia statute which
permitted payment of debts owed to citizens of Great Britain into
a special fund established by the state for that express purpose,
and thereby be discharged under Virginia law. The Court rejected
the theory that the treaty was not self-executing but had to be
affirmatively enacted into law:
On the best investigation I have been able to give the 4th
article of the treaty, I cannot conceive, that the wisdom of
men could express their meaning in more accurate and
intelligible words, or in words more proper and effectual to
carry their intention into execution. 56
On none of the occasions when the United States ratified the
revisions to the International Convention of 1883 at Washington
in 1911, at the Hague in 1925, and at London in 1934, were any
reservations made or legislative restrictions enacted purporting to
limit the clear effect of these Convention priority benefits. This is
confirmed in each of the proclamations ratifying the revisions of
1911, 1925 and 1934 under the Treaty Power of the United States,
"to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may
be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the United States of
America and citizens thereof.57
54. See, French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 506, 509-11 (1872);
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRUCTION, § 57.09 (Callaghan & Company 1972).
55. 3 U.S. (3 Dali) 199 (1796).
56. 3 U.S. (3 Dall) at 245 (1796).
57. See, 53 Stat. 1748.
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A. Provisions of Internal Law Regarding
Competence to Conclude Treaties
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a
provision of its internal law regarding competence to
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal
law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to
any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with
normal practice and in good faith.58
This provision serves the purpose of limiting the enforcement
of treaties and international conventions as domestic law, to such
provisions as would not violate the Constitution or be ultra vires
with respect to the authority of the federal government. Such a
limitation does not modify the previously noted principle that
treaties are on a parity with Acts or Congress, since such
limitations have long been applied as against constitutionally
infirm statutes.
B. Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a
Treaty as a Consequence of its Breach
A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the
parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate
it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the default-
ing State, or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a
ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in
whole or in part in the relations between itself and the
defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the
breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the
treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the
58. Vienna Convention, Part V, Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the
Operation of Treaties, Section 2: Invalidity of Treaties, Article 46.
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treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its
provisions by one party radically changes the position of
every party with respect to the further performance of its
obligations under the treaty.59
This provision is in accord with the general adherence by the
courts of the United States to the international rule of law that a
treaty is voidable, and not void upon breach by one of the parties,
and compliance may be insisted upon by aggrieved members.60
Failure to grant the Convention priority right of registration
to proper applicants would constitute a denunciation of the
Convention obligations of the United States, and such a material
breach of the Convention would permit the rescission of the
Convention by its members vis-a-vis the United States, and the
concomitant denial of special Convention privileges to citizens of
the United States seeking registration of trademarks in those
rescinding countries.
This analysis demonstrates the compelling importance of the
Circuit Court decision in Lemon Tree which reinterpreted the
Convention with respect to priority so as to fulfill the obligations
undertaken by the United States in conformity with the enabling
provision of the Federal Trademark Act.
VI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Construction of the law on priority cannot be restricted merely
to the enabling language of the Federal Trademark Act since this
would ignore the very purpose of the statute "to give effect to any
provision of such Convention." To give force to Article 4B of the
Convention does no violence to other provisions of the Federal
Trademark Act. Section 1 of the Trademark Act6 ' cannot properly
be construed to limit the protection of trademark rights to those
acquired solely by use in commerce. A corresponding provision
appeared in Section 2 of the 1905 Act which exempted foreign
applicants from stating that the mark had been used in commerce
with the United States or among the States thereof.62
59. Vienna Convention, Section 3: Termination and Suspension of the
Operation of Treaties, Article 60.
60. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933); Terlinden v. Ames, 184
U.S. 270, 287 (1902).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1975) requires submission of a statement "that the mark
is in use in commerce."
62. See also Report of the Commissioner, infra n.81, at 83, 86.
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The requirement in Section 1, that the applicant state that the
mark is in use in commerce (meaning commerce which may be
regulated by Congress pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1127), is expressly
waived by Section 44(d)(2) if the application is filed under Section
44(d) by a national of a Convention country. The fact that an
applicant is a national of a Convention country does not preclude
the applicant from making the statement, required by Section 1,
that "to the best of his knowledge and belief, the applicant has the
right to use such mark in commerce either in the identical form
thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated
to deceive."
Section 2(d)63 prohibits registration of a trademark "pre-
viously used in the United States by another." In the Lemon Tree
case, the District Court, sub silentio, interpreted "previously" to
mean before the actual U.S. filing date rather than the earlier
effective filing date corresponding. to the foreign filing date in
Canada under Section 44(d). That construction of Section 2(d)
could not have been intended by Congress. It not only ignores
Section 44(d), but the enabling mandate of Section 44(b) "to the
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention
... in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is
otherwise entitled by this Act." It also ignores the intent of the
Act specified in Section 45. Neither should be ignored in
construing Section 2(d). Instead, it is well established that the
task of the courts in interpreting separate provisions of a single
Act is to give the Act "the most harmonious, comprehensive
meaning possible" in light of the legislative policy and purpose.6 4
The word previously in Section 2(d) could only have been
intended by Congress to mean before the filing date in the
Convention country in those cases where the application is
entitled to a Convention filing date pursuant to Section 44(d). This
construction is confirmed by Section 44(d)(3) where the rights
acquired by third parties "before" the date of the filing of the first
application in a foreign country shall in no way be affected by a
registration under the priority provisions of the Statute.
Both of these interpretations were evaluated by the Appellate
Court in light of the legislation attempts to reconcile differences
between American and foreign trademark registration systems.
Although Section 1 required an indication of when a trademark
63. 15 U.S.C. 1052 (d) (1975).
64. See, Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 631-32
(1973); Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korn, 332 U.S. 480, 488 (1947).
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was first used in commerce, "foreign nationals applying pursuant
to Section 44(d) are exempted from that requirement. ' 65 Next, the
Appellate Court examined the language of the Convention which
resolved whatever doubt that may have existed concerning the
reach of Section 44(d), "[t]his revised version clearly provides that
an intervening use during the priority period cannot give rise to
rights on the part of third parties."66
As for Section 2(d) of the Federal Trademark Act, which
prohibits registration of a trademark "previously used in the
United States by another," the Appellate Court refused to
interpret that section in isolation from the context of the entire
statute, stating: "We need only interpret the word 'previously' in
Section 2(d) to mean 'before the filing date in the Convention
country' in order to give meaning to both statutory provisions. As
our earlier discussion indicates, both the structure of the Act and
its legislation history support such an interpretation."6 7
If the Appellate Court in Lemon Tree had followed the same
restrictive statutory interpretation as the District Court, these
convention priority benefits could have been effectively nullified,
even though it had been ratified by the United States without
reservation. But when liberally construed, the benefits of priority
afforded by the Convention were effectively implemented. As for
the narrow construction by the District Court in Lemon Tree, this
violated the principles of international comity and might have
resulted in further reprisals in relations between the United States
and other foreign nations, the very evil that Congress sought to
remedy by the enabling legislation:
Industrialists in this country have been seriously
handicapped in securing protection in foreign countries due
to our failure to carry out by statute our international
obligations. There has been no serious attempt fully to secure
to nationals of countries signatory to the conventions their
trade-mark rights in this country and to protect them against
the wrongs for which protection has been guaranteed by the
conventions. Naturally under such circumstances foreign
governments do not always give to citizens of the United
States their convention rights. To remedy this discreditable
situation is merely an act of international good faith.68
65. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 539 F.2d 196, 200 (1976).
66. 539 F.2d at 201.
67. Id. at 202.
68. Id. at 200.
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Since international agreements are completely dependent
upon the good will and honor of the contracting parties, the courts
have an obligation to interpret a statute related to a treaty so as to
avoid an infraction of any obligation thereunder and thereby a
breach of the pledged faith of the government of the United
States.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United
States, the courts should endeavor to construe the convention and
statute so as to give effect to both, which can be done without
violating the language of either. By this clause, the Constitution
places Convention provisions such as these in the same category
as other laws of Congress by its declaration that, "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land. ... ." (emphasis supplied).6 9
VII. APPLICABLE STATUTES
Section 44(d) of the Federal Trademark Act7" entitles nation-
als of foreign countries which have reciprocal trademark treaties
with the United States to a right of priority.71 This section
provides in pertinent part:
In application for registration of a mark under sections 1, 2,
3, 4, or 23 of this Act filed by a person described in paragraph
(b) of this section who has previously duly filed an
application for registration of the same mark in one of the
countries described in paragraph (b) shall be accorded the
same force and effect as would be accorded to the same
69. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1970).
71. Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), limits the
applicability of the Act to nationals of foreign countries, which have granted
reciprocal rights to citizens of the United States; and provide
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names of the repression of unfair
competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal
rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in
addition to the rights to which an owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this
Act. (Amended Oct. 9, 1962, 76 Stat. 759).
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application if filed in the United States on the same date on
which the application was first filed in such foreign country:
Provided, That-
(1) the application in the United States is filed within six
months from date on which the application was first filed in
the foreign country:
(2) the application conforms as nearly as practicable to the
requirements of this Act, but use in commerce need not be
alleged;
(3) the rights acquired by third parties before the date of the
filing of the first application in the foreign country shall in
no way be affected by a registration obtained on an
application filed under this subsection (d);
(4) nothing in this subsection (d) shall entitle the owner of a
registration granted under this section to sue for acts
committed prior to the date on which his mark was registered
in this country unless the registration is based on use in
commerce.
72
Section 44(d) must be construed in context with the intent of
the Act expressed in Section 45 of the Lanham Act.73 "The intent
of this Act is . . ." to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks . . .entered into
between the United States and foreign nations." 74
These statutory prerequisites were met in the Lemon Tree
case: (1) Appellant Langis was a Canadian corporation; (2) An
application for United States registration of the "Lemon Tree"
mark was filed in the United States within 6 months of an earlier
Canadian application for registration of the same mark; and (3)
Canada is a party to the International Convention, as revised at
London in 1934, to which the United States is also a party. By its
very terms, the enabling provisions of Section 44(b) extend the
benefits of priority under Section 44(b), to any person whose
country of origin is a party to any convention or a treaty
relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party,
"to the extent necessary to give effect to any provisions of such
convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to
which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this Act."
72. Amended Oct. 3, 1961, 75 Stat. 748.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
74. Amended October 9, 1962, 76 Stat. 769.
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When the formalities or procedural prerequisites for priority
have been met, "it is the intent of the treaty to confer a
substantive right to the protection of the foreign mark."
75
The right of priority has long been regarded by the Patent
Office as a substantive right of a foreign applicant which is not
defeated by the application of a domestic applicant who claims
use in commerce commencing during the interval between the
foreign applicant's convention filing date and its application
filing date within 6 months of the first foreign filing date.76
VIII. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 44(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946 carries forward the
right of priority enacted by Congress for the first time in Section 4
of the 1905 Trademark Act:
Sec. 4. That an application for registration of a Trade-
mark filed in this country by any person who has previously
regularly filed in any foreign country which, by treaty,
convention, or law, affords similar privileges to citizens of
the United States an application for registration of the same
trade-mark shall be accorded the same force and effect as
would be accorded to the same application if filed in this
country on the date on which application for registration of
the same trade-mark was first filed in such foreign country:
Provided, That such application is filed in this country
within four months from the date on which the application
was first filed in such foreign country. 77
The intent of Congress in enacting the priority provisions of
the 1905 Act was to implement what is understood to be the
obligations of the United States to provide a priority right under
Article 4 of the Paris Convention. Congress further understood
that the priority right necessary to give effect to Article 4 meant a
right which would not be defeated by use of the mark by a third
party during the priority period of four months (now 6 months)
after the filing of an application for registration in a convention
country. 78 In the Congressional Report accompanying the bill
75. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940).
76. Purex Corp., Ltd. v. C.R.I.E., 148 USPQ 388, 389 (TT&AB, 1965).
77. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592 § 4, 33 Stat. 725.
78. S. REP. No. 3278 (incorporating H. REP. No. 3147), 58th Cong., 3d Sess.,
3-4 (1905).
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enacted as the Trademark act of 1905, the House Committee
stated that the bill "would so amend the trade-mark laws of the
United States as to conform to our treaty obligations with the
other nations." 79
Specifically, Congress had before it the following Committee
interpretation of Article 4 of the Paris Convention:
Article 4 provides that any person who shall have
regularly deposited an application for a trademark in one of
the contracting States shall enjoy, for the purpose of making
the deposit in the other States, and under the reserve of the
rights of third parties, a right of priority of three months in
Europe and four months in countries beyond the sea,80 during
which a deposit subsequently made in one of the other States
of the said Union cannot be invalidated by another deposit or
by the employment of the mark.
No provision is made in the law of 1881 for the
precedence of a prior applicant in another State of the Union
for the Protection of Industrial Property over an applicant for
registration here.
It is to be noted that Article 4 excepts out from its
provisions the right of third parties. We understand this to
mean those in the United States who obtain title to a mark
by use before application abroad. It is also to be noted that
the use of the mark after the deposit of the application is one
of the States of the Union will not invalidate the claim to
registration during the period of four months thereafter.
Now, as a trademark cannot be registered under the present
law except to the first user, the registration abroad should be
given the effect of a user of the mark in this country at the
date of the first application. (Emphasis supplied.)81
Congress understood that the priority right necessary to
implement Article 4 of the Paris Convention meant a right which
79. Id. at 4.
80. This includes the United States.
81. Report of the Commissioner Appointed to Revise the Statutes Relating to
Patents, Trade and Other Marks, and Trade and Commercial Names, Senate
Document No. 29, 56th Congress, 2d Session, p. 42 (1902). This earlier concept of
constructive use, as opposed to merely a procedural right of constructive filing, has
been recognized very recently by the Patent Office in Satinine Societa in Mome
Colletivo di S.A. e.M. Usellini v. P.A.B. Products et Appareils de Beaute, 194 USPQ
209, 211 (VtIAB, 1977).
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would not be defeated by use of the mark by a third party
commenced during the priority period of four months (now 6
months) after the filing of an application for registration in a
convention country. Accordingly, Congress must have intended to
provide such a right when it specified in Section 4 of the 1905
Trademark Act that the U.S. application of a foreign applicant
"shall be accorded the same force and effect as would be accorded
to the same application if filed in this country on the date on
which application for registration of the same trademark was first
filed in such foreign country." Section 2 of the 1905 Trademark
Act specifically exempted foreign applicants from stating that the
mark had been used in commerce with the United States or among
the States thereof.
The legislative history accompanying the Federal Trademark
Act of 1946 also subscribed to the recognized necessity for
carrying out the provisions of the various international conven-
tions pertaining to the protection of trademarks.8 2 Senate Report
No. 1019 accompanying the 1961 amendments to the Federal
Trademark Act contains the following pertinent language:8 3
[I]n effect, the filing Of an application for patent in one
country constitutes a constructive filing of applications for
patent for the same invention in all other countries on the
same date, which constructive filing is made actual in a
particular country by the filing of a formal application in
that country within [one] year of the date of filing of the first
application . . . This provision of the convention is enacted
in Title 35, United States Code, Section 119, in the case of
patent applications and in Title 15, United States Code,
Section 1126(d) in the case of trademark applications.
(Emphasis supplied.)8 4
Since 1905, the Patent Office has consistently recognized prior
rights claimed under the Convention by foreign nationals on the
82. Senate Report No. 1333 (May 14, 1946); 1946 United States Congressional
Code Service, at page 1276, entitled "Purposes of the present Bill." See note 68
supra.
83. 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3047, accompanying the 1961
amendments to the Lanham Act, prompted by the 1958 Lisbon Revision of the
Convention.
84. The relevant interpretations and constructions of the Convention and the
U.S. Patent Laws are applicable, as modified by specific conte: to consideration of
the Trademark Laws. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS, § 633,
p. 1197 (Harv. Univ. Press 1975).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
basis of previously filed foreign applications, in lieu of use in
commerce. 85 Great weight also must be given to this long prior
construction of the priority provisions by the governmental
agency charged with the administration thereof, as having risen
to the level of Executive agency policy.86 This legislative history
reconfirms that Section 44(c) was enacted to carry out the
underlying principles of the Convention that Congress initially
sought to implement by enactment of Section 4 of the 1905
Trademark Act when the priority provisions were initially
enacted, Article 4 of the Paris Convention at that time was
thought not to be self-executing. 7 This same point was subse-
quently made to Congress by former Commissioner Conway P.
Coe, who stated:
It has been held that those treaties, certain phases of
them, are not self-executing; so in the interest of clarity, as
well as the integrity of treating obligations, we have put the
treaty provisions into our law and this has that object in
mind. (Emphasis supplied.) 88
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no indication either in the legislative history of the
Federal Trademark Act or the International Convention negotia-
tions that the United States sought to restrict recognition of its
priority obligations under the Convention which has been
embraced within the implementing statute. To deny this benefit to
foreign nationals, while desiring to take advantage of the benefits
member countries were extending to nationals of this country
would have been contrary to the basic objective of the Convention.
Thus, the roots that lead to a satisfactory resolution of the Lemon
Tree dispute arose from a heritage dedicated to achieve an accord
between every industrial nation of the world.
85. Rules 27 and 34, Rules of the Patent Office, revised December 1, 1905; Rule
33, Rules of the Patent Office, revised August 1, 1932; Rule 7.9 Rules of Practice in
Trademark Cases, July 5, 1947. Testimony of First Assistant Commissioner Leslie
Frazer, Hearings on H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 124 (1944).
86. United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295,
314-15 (1953); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 1st Security Bank of Utah, 405
U.S. 394, 420 n.16 (1972).
87. 1902 Report of the Commissioners, supra n.81 at p. 83, comment referring
to Section 8 of the proposed bill and p. 86 referring to Section 30 of the proposed
bill. But see, Note 20, supra for later interpretations.
88. Hearings on H.R. 9041, 75th Cong, 3d Sess. 195 (1938).
